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What Was the Role of Galileo in the
Century-Long Birth of Modern Science?
Antonino Drago
Federico II University, Napoli (Italy)
Résumé : Quel est le rôle de Galilée dans la naissance séculaire de la science
moderne ? Je réponds à la question ci-dessus à la lumière de deux nouveaux
éléments. Dès le xvie siècle, Nicolas de Cues, quoiqu’il ne pratiquât pas la
science expérimentale, a anticipé une partie substantielle de la révolution
copernicienne et de la naissance de la méthodologie galiléenne. Le deuxième
élément est l’introduction d’une nouvelle conception des fondements de la
science ; ils sont définis comme constitués de trois dialectiques. Après cette
définition, la naissance de la science moderne correspond à un très long proces-
sus historique qui se conclut à notre époque. Sur cette longue période, Galilée
ne fut pas seulement le premier à recourir à une méthodologie scientifique,
mais aussi presque le seul à jamais avoir été conscient de l’ampleur des enjeux
intellectuels de l’entreprise scientifique.
Abstract: I answer the above question in the light of two new elements.
Firstly, in the 15th century while Cusanus did not practice experimental
science, he substantially anticipated both the Copernican revolution and the
birth of Galilei’s methodology. Secondly, I shall introduce a new conception of
the foundations of modern science which are constituted by three dialectics.
In this light, the complete birth of modern science, whose scope was so broad,
required a very long historical process, which was completed in recent years.
Within this long time span, Galileo was not only the first to practice a
scientific methodology, but also almost the only scientist ever to be aware
of the intellectual breadth of scientific enterprise.
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1 Introduction: What are the foundations
of science? The three dialectics
The role played by Galileo in the birth of modern science depends on two
questions: What is the definition of modern science, in particular its foun-
dations? How long was the process of birth of modern science? Without
doubt, the foundations of science are constituted by the well-known dialectic1
between experimental data and mathematical hypothesis. But after that, what
in precise terms?
I suggest the following definition of the foundations of science that I
obtained on the basis of four decades of historical works on the main theories of
logic, mathematics and physics; they are constituted by two more dialectics of
a theoretical nature; one between the two kinds of infinity (either potential, or
actual) and a dialectic between the two types of organization of a theory (either
deductive form principles-axioms, as Aristotle theorized in ancient times, AO,
or aimed at the solution of a crucial problem, PO). The infinity dialectic
was formalized, by, on one hand, classical mathematics relying on the actual
infinity (AI) (e.g., Zermelo’s axiom) and on the other hand by constructive
mathematics relying on (almost) only potential infinity (PI) [Markov 1962],
[Bishop 1967]. The organization dialectic was formalized by means of the kind
of logic managing it; on the one hand classical logic, managing AO (e.g., in
Euclid’s Elements) and, on the other hand, non-classical logic, in particular
intuitionist logic [Dummett 1977] managing PO [Drago 1990, 2012b]. When
a scientist builds a theory, each theoretical dialectic appears under its formal
aspect; a formal alternative is opposite to and incompatible with the other
alternative; the scientist has to choose one. In sum, both dialectics constitute
two scientific dichotomies. Once the choices are made, each dialectic is
dissolved and the scientist proceeds within the scientific realm to establish
the notions and principles of his theory. However, when we consider all
the theories of a scientific discipline—e.g., physics—we again recognize these
theoretical dialectics in the different couples of choices on which the various
theories rely. In the light of the above illustrated foundations of science, the
question of the birth of modern science receives a first, partial answer: modern
science was born when not only its method for producing accurate results was
recognized, but also its foundations, i.e., the two theoretical dialectics. Since
the alternative choices of these dialectics were not formalized and recognized
as relevant for science before the second half of the last century, we obtain a
surprising result: the birth of modern science is a historical process spanning
1. I use the word “dialectic” in the intuitive sense, but in a Platonic sense as
both authors [Hopkins 1988], [Counet 2005] do. It is not the Hegelian dialectic (that
transcends reality through a dynamic of the Absolute Spirit); roughly speaking, it is
given by two polarities that are not necessarily on the same plane. It may be resolved
by either a reconciliation (as in the first dialectic) or by a choice between the two
alternatives of the dialectic (as in the cases we will see in the following).
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several centuries, at least half a millennium. In the following sections, we will
detail this long process in relation to Galileo. Notice that the three dialectics
of the foundations of science are mutually independent. Thus, according to
the above definition, the question about the birth of modern science has to
be disentangled into the three questions about when each of these dialectics
emerged and was then established, at first in intuitive and then in formal terms.
In what follows, I will deal with them by considering each dialectic at a
time.
2 The dialectic experiment/ mathematical
hypothesis. Its historical birth and
its problematic definition
Certainly, the historical start of modern science was marked above all by the
birth of the experimental method through its innumerable applications giving
new scientific results. Even a first, rough definition of this method was enough
to mark an unprecedented novelty with respect to the philosophical world of
the ancient Greeks. Rightly, historians of science attributed a crucial impor-
tance to this method. However, regarding this dialectic it is no longer possible
to assume a positivist viewpoint, which attributes an eminent role to Galileo
because he, more than any other, set hard experimental facts against the
idealistic philosophical tenets of Aristotelian philosophers. If the experimental
method was what positivist historians claim, that is, dealing above all with
hard, experimental facts, it would be easy to determine a date for the births
of both scientific activity and the method governing it. Instead, Grosseteste,
Francis Bacon, Cusanus, Lavoisier, etc., suggested different aspects of this
dialectic. Moreover, Galileo is a complex figure; in contradiction to the above
appraisal, he also declared that he could obtain scientific results without
experiments [Galilei 1638, II Day]. In addition, the question of whether
Galileo’s activity conformed to a well-defined experimental method is largely
undecided. For instance, about Galileo’s capital achievement—the discovery
of the law of the accelerated motion—Galluzzi wrote:
[...] it is not still made irrefutably clear which element of the
Galilean investigation was decisive in such an enterprise: either
the natural deduction or the observation, either the geometrico-
mathematical analogy or the experiment. [Galluzzi 1979, 158]
Notwithstanding having pondered for three centuries on this dialectic, philoso-
phers of science did not suggest any common agreement on its main features.
We know that not only positivist, but also neo-positivist philosophy, although
supported by excellent scholars, failed in this task. No surprise if this unsat-
isfactory situation is presented by Feyerabend as no method at all in science
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[Feyerabend 1975]. Recently, two scholars wrote an even more discouraging
appraisal:
[...] More recent debate has questioned whether there is anything
like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science
and only science. [Andersen & Hepburn 2015]
The plain conclusion to be derived from these unsuccesses is that this dialectic
is philosophy-laden. Indeed, both Koyré and Lindberg stressed that the
establishment of the experimental method was the result and at the same
time the cause of a profound change not only in the methodology aimed at
obtaining answers from nature, but also in the metaphysical conception of
reality [Koyré 1957], [Lindberg 1992].
3 The dialectic experiment/ theoretical
hypothesis. Its historical birth and
Cusanus’ contributions
In such a context of uncertainty about this dialectic, new results concerning
how Cusanus suggested combining experimental data with mathematical hy-
potheses are important. This relationship of combination was essentially new
with respect to Greek philosophy, which considered a conjunction between
mathematics and reality to be impossible. It was new also according to the
idea that was staunchly emphasized by Koyré, i.e., modern science overcame
the finiteness of the Greek world (Aristotle) by introducing a mathematics
explicitly involving infinity, i.e., either potential infinity (i.e., unlimited), or
actual infinity. According to some scholars this dialectic started, although
in a reduced form of a mere programme, in the 13th century with Robert
Grosseteste’s (1175-1253) book De Luce [Crombie 1994, II, 319], [Lewis 2007].
However, subsequently, in the 15th century Cusanus (1401-1484) suggested im-
portant aspects of this method, although he intermixed them with theological,
philosophical and cosmological subjects, all treated in a somewhat obscure way
[Cusanus 1972]. First, he provided an accurate philosophical basis. According
to him the two words mens and mensura share the same root; the mens
connects itself to reality through a mensura; the mens mutually compares
through proportions the numbers obtained (remember that a proportion was
the only mathematical technique used in physics before the time of Galileo and
Descartes) and moreover it mutually combines the corresponding concepts in
order to obtain theoretical constructs.2
2. The “Introduction” by Graziella Federici Vescovini to [Cusanus 1450] is very
informative about current scientific knowledge in Cusanus’ time. Apart from her—in
my opinion too severe—criticisms, she cleverly summarizes Cusanus’ conception of
human knowledge: “The mind is thus specular simplicity that all obtains from its
capability of measuring, numbering and representing”, [Federici Vescovini 2003, xxx].
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In addition, in the book De staticis experimentis3 Cusanus indicated the
main features of an experimental science through the measurements of a
particular physical magnitude, weight:
And thus, by means of experiments done with weight-scales he
[the physician] would draw nearer, through a more precise surmise,
unto all that is known. [Cusanus 1450, 608, 164]
[...] Experimental knowledge requires extensive written records.
For the more written records there are, the more infallibly we
can arrive, based on experiments, at the art elicited from the
experiments. [Cusanus 1450, 615, 178]
Notice that in ancient times weight, being considered a quality of a body, was
extraneous to geometry. Its quantification as a quantity decisively introduced
scholars to the quantifying of a multitude of other physical properties [Crombie
1994, 423].4 Furthermore, in the history of physics the transition from the
theoretical concept of absolute weight to the concept of relative weight played
an exceptional role. According to Koyré, Galileo considered only absolute
weight, because he thought there was one single centre of the universe, i.e.,
the Sun, from which he could not free himself [Koyré 1978, 25 ff.]. Before him,
Cusanus had already abolished any centre of the universe whatsoever as well as
any fixed locations for celestial bodies.5 In fact, in the above mentioned book
Cusanus used not so much weight but weight difference. Remarkably, by means
of a Roman scale together with a hourglass Cusanus wanted to determine
other physical quantities: e.g., the volume of a body, its specific weight, the
weather, the temperature, the sound, the magnetic force, the weight of the air
by means of the so-called leaning tower of Pisa experiment, etc.; so that he
verbally introduced the indirect measures and, ultimately, the doubly artificial
apparatus of measurement. One historian evaluates Cusanus’ work in the
following terms:
3. In the following, I will refer to Jasper Hopkins’ English translations of almost
all Cusanus’ online books http://www.jasper-hopkins.info/.
4. About this point, Koyré, strangely enough ignored Cusanus’ suggestions which
constituted those advances that Koyré himself considered a crucial step in the history
of the scientific method: “It is ironic that two thousands years beforehand, Pythagoras
had proclaimed that number is the same essence of things, and the Bible had taught
that God had founded the World on “number, weight, measure” [Wisdom, 11, 21].
All people reiterated that, nobody believed that. Surely, nobody before Galileo took
that seriously. No one attempted to determine these numbers, these weights and
these measures. No one attempted to count, to weigh, to measure. Or, more exactly,
no one had the idea of counting, of weighing and of measuring. Or, more exactly, no
one ever sought to get beyond the practical uses of number, weight, measure in the
imprecision of everyday life. [...]” [Koyré 1961, 360]. It is apparent that Cusanus did
exactly what Koyré stressed as lacking and he did it inspired by the same Biblical
passage.
5. See Santinello for innovations and advances of Cusanus in science [Santinello
1987, 105–109]. In particular, notice that Copernicus knew Cusanus’ modern view of
Heaven without any center [Klibansky 1953].
40 Antonino Drago
In the mid-fifteenth century appeared what should have been the
crowning work of this genre, the Idiota de staticis experimentis,
from the pen of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. This incidental
piece from one of the best-known philosophers and churchmen
of the time does not appear to have attracted much attention. It
advocates the use of balance and the comparison of weights for the
solution of a wide range of phenomena, ranging from mechanics
to medicine, and including those of chemical. He advocates
differences in weights as a guide to the evaluation of natural
waters, the condition of blood and urine in sickness and health, the
evaluation of the efficacy of drugs and the identification of metals
and alloys. It would be difficult to find a more specific prescrip-
tion for what scientists were actually doing two centuries later.
[Multhauf 1978, 386]
A century and a half after Cusanus, the first of Galileo’s three periods of
activity, was devoted especially to the study of physical phenomena relating
to weight (e.g., a rolling ball on an incline, a pendulum) [Wisan 1974, 136–161].
This is the physics of the Earth, which, unlike the celestial one, which is based
only on observation, is manipulative, as is modern science. Later, Newton’s use
of the new, marvellous mathematics of infinitesimal analysis assigned instead
the highest role to celestial physics, despite the fact that the foundations of
this mathematics were unknown and manifestly linked to the metaphysics of
actual infinity [Newton 1687]. Yet, three centuries after Cusanus and one
century after Newton, chemistry was born. This event was a “postponed
revolution” (a chapter title of [Butterfield 1949]), since, being influenced by
his idealistic mathematics, Newton has led chemists in a misleading direction,
relying on several metaphysical notions: absolute space, absolute time, fixed
and perfectly hard atoms, gravitational force as constituting the intermolecular
links. Lavoisier freed chemistry from all of a priori notions by appropriately
re-defining the experimental method for his field of research, i.e., all that
concerned the complete methodology of chemical reactions. Lavoisier founded
chemistry by means of only those physical measurements which had been
suggested by Cusanus, i.e., weight differences that he considered between the
reagent substances and the compounded substances [Drago 2009b]6. He linked
these weight differences to weight-mass conservation. This was a trivial law
according to Cusanus, since God pervades matter, which therefore cannot
change in quantity [Crombie 1959, 296], [Drago 2009b].— One may object that
Cusanus’ book constitutes a mere program of research, since he never practised
experimental science to the point of obtaining scientific results (he however
invented the hygrometer). Yet, recall that at least among the musicians
a very ancient and widespread practice obtained new results from artificial
6. Kuhn devotes a page to stressing the importance of physical magnitude weight
for the birth of chemistry [Kuhn 1957, 262]. Yet, strangely enough he attributes this
influence to Newton.
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instruments. It is not by chance that Galileo’s father, his brother and he also
were musicians. Moreover, through the method which Cusanus had described,
several physical laws were established, first those of acoustical instruments. In
particular, Galileo’s father, Vincenzo, inductively inferred from experiments
on the string tensions obtained by charging weights more accurate and general
laws than Pythagoras’ law [Cohen 1984, 84].7 Hence, Cusanus did not need to
put his program into practice, since artisans were already implicitly applying
it to several kinds of phenomena.
4 The dialectic experiment/ mathematical
hypothesis. Its historical birth and
Galileo’s determinant achievements
A century and a half after Cusanus, Galileo extensively applied the experi-
ment/hypothesis dialectic to several fields of physical phenomena. However,
Galileo had a particular conception of this dialectic, as his celebrated words
emphasize:
Philosophy [read: science] is written in that great book which
ever lies before our eyes—I mean the universe—but we cannot
understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp
the symbols, in which it is written. This book is written in the
mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and
other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to
comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in
vain through a dark labyrinth. [Galilei 1890, vi, 232]
This mathematical language is the same as God’s; and whereas we have to
go step by step, He sees all in the blink of an eye. Hence, geometry was
already written in the world since eternity. In this conception of Galileo we
recognize—as Koyré correctly emphasized, scandalizing the positivist histori-
ans of science—an ontology: not only is mathematics outside our minds (which
however can understand it), it is essentially inherent in both reality and God;
that is, Galileo considers geometry such a perfect theory as to be a supernatural
theory that structures reality.8 This Platonist conception of mathematics
7. He improved Pythagoras’s law, successfully suggesting the quadratic and even
more complex relationships between two variables; this was a mathematical break-
through, which later his son Galileo performed for the law regarding the case of the
falling bodies; an initial law stating a linear relationship between space and time, was
discarded by Galileo in favour of a law stating a square relationship.
8. For the same reason, Koyré assumed a prejudice of a mathematical-physicist,
i.e., an absolute accuracy in the results of measurements [Koyré 1961]. Therefore, he
opposed the historians (e.g., Crombie) whose conceptions of the history of science do
not attribute a basic role to actual infinity.
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influenced the entire history of theoretical physics. The subsequent physical
theory, geometrical optics, made use of points at infinity as if they were
ordinary points. Moreover, Newton’s mathematical technique was infinitesimal
analysis, which is informed by a Platonist philosophy of infinitesimals. In the
19th century, this conception reached a climax through the dominant role
played by mathematical physics, a role which in 20th century was countered
by the discovery of quanta and then symmetries.
Mathematics indeed may be joined with experiment also according to
an instrumental conception of it, as is the case in both chemistry and
thermodynamics [Drago 2009b, 2012a]. In fact, a century and a half before
Galileo, Cusanus had suggested an alternative philosophical conception of
mathematics, which was summarized by McTighe [McTighe 1970]. According
to him, ideal mathematical entities are built from reality (and not, as Galileo
claimed, recognized as the ideal elements of reality), i.e., they are constructs
of our minds. Whereas ordinary knowledge of reality is always approximate
and hence it is not subject to the principle of non-contradiction (through
a sharp and exhaustive division into true and false), instead, mathematics
is perfect knowledge because it enjoys a specific feature; it strictly obeys
this principle. Owing to this logical property, mathematics is considered
by Cusanus the most certain knowledge we have; for this reason, we apply
it to understanding reality. Moreover Cusanus conceived numbers as the
explicit forms of unity, i.e., a number enjoys the property of being both as
great and as small as it can be; thus it is through numbers that all things
are best understood, i.e., referred to unity. For these reasons, the creation
of our minds, mathematics, can direct our interpretation of reality. Indeed,
by combining experimental data with mathematics the intellectus conjectures
the mathematical formula of a physical law. This Cusanus’ way of describing
the relationship between mathematics and experiment more adequately than
Galileo’s previous quotation describes the activity of an experimental physicist
(e.g., in such a way—by means of a conjecture—the law of falling bodies
actually originated in Galileo [Wisan 1974, 207–222]). Furthermore, Galileo
knew only the mathematics of geometry and proportions and did not share
in the effort—elicited, e.g., by his disciples Cavalieri and Torricelli—to extend
the realm of mathematics [Drago 2003]. Also for this reason, the theory of
mechanics was born later, through Newton, since it required the invention of
a very different mathematics, calculus (just as at present time the advances
in theoretical physics require the new mathematical technique of symmetries).
Before Galileo, Cusanus had, on the other hand, been able to expand the
mathematics of his time (geometry and proportions) to new achievements (we
will see them in the next section).
I conclude that Cusanus offered to theoretical physics a more adequate
metaphysics of the scientific methodology than Galileo’s, owing to latter’s
Platonist view of mathematics. Yet, most historians disregarded the entire
metaphysical and mathematical change brought about by the introduction
of the scientific method. For an instance, Cohen gave a totally objectivist
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definition [Cohen 1984, 85–86]. The experimental method developed by Galileo
enjoys the following two features:
• it is mathematical in that the relationships between the parameters
are quantitative, in that the proofs are geometrical, and above all the
properties of falling and projecting bodies are logically derived from a
set of a priori postulates;
• it is experimental in that not [only] daily experience but nature subjected
to artificial manipulation provides both the starting point and the final
empirical check of the axiomatic system.
Cohen’s words “a priori postulates” and “axiomatic” attribute to Galileo’s
thinking the choice AO; in the following section 6, I will disprove it. I remark
that all Cohen’s features of the scientific method are present in Cusanus,
including “the final empirical check”, in the cases of a physician wanting
to cure a patient and a musician wanting to perfect his musical instruments
[Cusanus 1450, 622–623]. Yet, his illustration does not follow a precise order,
somewhat inattentive and also fanciful. It is apparent that this deficiency of
Cusanus is due to his lack of experimental practice, which he left to others (e.g.,
artisans, musicians).9 The reason is that Cusanus is interested in exploring
only the mind’s faculties, not natural phenomena. Hence, he sees the elements
of knowledge but he does not apply them to producing knowledge from finite
reality; he is too interested in infinite reality. At most, he is interested in
physical principles; e.g., the principle of relativity (through the celebrated
observation that over a ship sailing in a calm sea the phenomena are the same
as those on the land), the impossibility of a perpetual motion, the inertia
principle [Cusanus 1462-1463].
Galileo played a key historical role in the introduction of the dialectic
experiment/mathematical hypothesis, since i) he qualified this dialectic, ii)
he introduced the mathematical description of the evolution of phenomena
(kinematics in space and time); iii) through it, he established breakthrough
theoretical laws, in particular the decisive experimental law of falling bodies,
which described reality in contrast with everyday experience. This result
established a new kind of truth, since it was objective in two respects,
i.e., the experimental and the mathematical joined in an objective unity.
Moreover, iv) he decisively propagandized his historically important advances
notwithstanding the harsh opposition of Aristotelian philosophers of his time;
v) he practised and made this method productive to the extent of achieving an
essential part of a mechanical theory; vi) his great and long activity produced
so many scientific results that it eventually established a stable tradition of
experimental research that, subsequently followed by several other scholars,
9. He contented himself with illustrating his experimental method by describing
the simplest artificial instrument, a wood spoon [Cusanus 1450, IV, chap. II, IV].
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systematically accumulated new commonly recognized results.10 From all
the above I conclude that Cusanus anticipated all the elements of Galileo’s
experimental method; however, this consideration in no way detracts from
Galileo’s glory in having organized all these elements into a consistent set of
rules and systematically applied them to a multitude of natural phenomena, so
that he established a new tradition in science. Rather, the above anticipations
by Cusanus present the historical birth of this dialectic as a less clear-cut
change than that commonly presented by historians in the following words:
“Galileo had no forebears and stands apart from history” [Wallace 1998, 27].
5 The second dialectic: potential infinity/
actual infinity. Its historical birth
Ancient Greek mathematicians deliberately avoided the use of the infinity.
Late, first Cusanus introduced a conception of the infinity into mathematics11
and developed it (e.g., he presented the intuitive notion of a mathematical
limit as a series of multilateral polygons approaching a circle). Owing to this
innovation, Cassirer considered Cusanus to be the first modern philosopher of
knowledge [Cassirer 1950].12 In addition, I have discovered [Drago 2009a,
2012a] that he defined (without mathematical formula, yet through exact
words, the infinitesimal: “of which there cannot be a lesser [positive] number”
[Cusanus 1440, I, 4, 11], i.e., the basic notion, the hyper-real number, of non-
standard analysis [Robinson 1960, chap. X]. On the other hand, two centuries
after Cusanus, Galileo’s conception of mathematics was mostly that of the
ancients, also regarding infinity. In the book concluding his scientific career
[Galilei 1638, First Day] he discusses the two ideas of infinity (AI and PI) in
order to understand how to apply one of them to physics. Having dissected the
problem, Galileo concludes that in mathematics one cannot define the usual
arithmetical operations on infinite objects. Moreover, by recognizing that he
is unable to decide which kind of infinity he has to choose and even when one
10. This appraisal on Galileo’s contributions to this dialectic is comparable with
similar appraisals suggested by eminent scholars on Galileo’s method, i.e., Wisan,
Machamer and McMullin [Wallace 1992, 7–12].
11. It was recognised also by G. Cantor, the inventor of the Theory of (infinite)
Sets [Cantor 1883, fn. 2].
12. “This one’s stand facing the problem of knowledge of Cusanus does him the first
modern thinker” [Cassirer 1978, I, 39]. He presents Cusanus as: “[...] the founder and
champion of modern philosophy” [Cassirer 1978, I, 39]. Note also [Vanstenbeerghe
1920, 279]: “The key to the philosophical system of Nicholas of Cusa [...]—and this is
very modern—is its theory of knowledge”. Unfortunately, Koyré overlooked Cusanus’
role [Federici Vescovini 1994], although Cusanus more than any other scholar broke—
precisely the fortunate title of the major Koyré’s book—the closed Cosmos of the
Ancient Greeks and opened minds to the infinite Universe.
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of them is useful in formulating his laws, he asks to be allowed in any case to
make use of the notion of infinity in theoretical physics.
6 The third dialectic: axiomatic
organization/ problem-based
organization. Its historical birth
During the birth of modern science, Cusanus organized his theological theories
in a different form from the Aristotelian organization, i.e., on problems (PO)
[Drago 2009c, 2012b]. This point was very clear to him as a theologian: in
theology to choose AO means to derive all the truths from a priori dogmas;
however Cusanus wanted to solve problems, e.g., the best name of God, the
double nature of Christ, the Trinity, the constitution of both the Universe and
matter, the new logic, peace in the world, etc. Also his scientific programme
of weight measuring is aimed at solving problems, ultimately the problem of
how to acquire the knowledge of the natural world. In sum, also in scientific
subjects Cusanus’ choice is for PO. A century and a half after Cusanus,
Galileo’s theoretical formulations of his scientific results did not conform to
the traditional way of organizing a theory, AO, either, which he knew well;13
in particular, he never appeals to some general principle from which to deduce
physical laws [Clavelin 1996, 66]. Yet, he does not assume a definite position
on this dialectic. In each of his last two books he illustrates their contents by
alternating two kinds of organization—deductive and dialogical-inductive, the
latter recalling the dialogues of Aristotle’s adversary, Plato. In sum, he did
not choose a specific model (also because he did not complete any theory).
As a matter of fact, Galileo’s experimental method of producing science is in
contrast with the Aristotelian model of organizing a scientific theory (see its
elementary presentation in [Beth 1959, § 1.2]), but subsequent scientists, owing
to his inconclusive position on this subject, eventually lessened the import of
his innovations; they changed only one postulate of the Aristotelian model, the
evidence postulate, which was attributed no longer to axioms, but to the data
of the theory.14 In sum, the result was a mere reform of this organization, not
an alternative model to AO.
13. It is a merit of W.A. Wallace to have emphasized Galileo’s Juvenilia
manuscripts concerning the illustration of Aristotle’s apodictic organization of a
theory. Yet, Wallace wanted to exploit this fact in order to link Galileo to Aristotelian
philosophy, although Galileo’s last two books manifestly show that he did not share
Aristotle’s model of organization [Wallace 1992], [Coppola & Drago 1984].
14. As a consequence the dialogical parts of Galileo’s last two books have been
misinterpreted as no more than odd presentations of the subject to the reader.
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7 The third dialectic: classical logic/
non-classical logic. Its historical birth
The dialectic regarding the kind of organization is formalized by means of two
different kinds of logic, respectively classical logic—governing the deductions
of a AO theory—and non-classical logic—governing the inductions of a PO
theory. Some scholars have remarked that the logical ways of arguing of both
Cusanus and Galileo are different from those of classical logic. These differ-
ences were attributed to their attendance at the Padua school of logic, where
Zabarella made the greatest effort to theorize a different way of reasoning from
that of Aristotle. Actually, after the Padua period, Cusanus wanted to found a
new kind of logic and he was successful in this aim. He believed that Aristotle’s
logic represented a specific activity of the ratio, a particular way of arguing of
the mens; yet, according to him there exists another activity of the mind, i.e.,
the intellectus, which generates coniecturae according to a new kind of logic.
He wanted to characterize the specific laws of this new logic. He suggested a
celebrated “coincidence of opposites”, which he later abandoned as ineffective.
Rather he implicitly changed logic. An accurate inspection of his texts shows
that he made use of the characteristic propositions of non-classical logic, those
for which the double negation law fails; i.e., the doubly negated propositions
whose corresponding affirmative propositions lack evidence (DNPs). Through
them he solved his main problem—the best to name God—, by suggesting
names pertaining to non-classical logic (Not-Other, Posse=est). Moreover, he
was capable of developing the logical arguments, which are specific to the ideal
model of a PO theory, i.e., ad absurdum arguments [Drago 2012a].
Some authors have remarked, on the other hand, that Galileo paid little
attention to logic. In particular, he never attacked Aristotle’s legacy in
logic. Moreover, his last two books present a strange logical approach; when
expounding theorems, he makes use of propositions in Latin in accordance
with classical logic;15 when illustrating his investigations he makes use of
a Platonist-like dialogue among three people all speaking the vulgar Italian
language; an inspection of the logic of these dialogues recognizes several DNPs
and hence an implicit use of non-classical logic [De Luise & Drago 1995, 2009].
As an instance, let us consider the first 50 pages of his De motu locali. An
examination of them shows that:
1. The parts of his text written in Latin and concerning formal theorems
do not include DNPs;
2. The other parts—written in vulgar Italian—include more than
100 DNPs;
15. On this basis, Wallace states that “if one takes reliance on Aristotle’s logical
canons to be the sign of a Peripatetic, one [Galileo] can rightfully be called a
Peripatetic himself”, [Wallace 1998, 51]. Yet he ignores the inductive parts of Galileo’s
theoretical work.
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3. However, some of them are uncertain because some are dubious;
4. Moreover, there is no DNP in the part illustrating rectilinear uniform
motion;
5. Instead there are around 90 DNPs in the 25 pages dedicated to solving
the problem of naturally accelerated motion;
6. The latter DPNs compose 8 cycles of reasoning, which are illustrated by
table 1;
7. Three of these cycles are ad absurdum proofs;
8. His reasoning eventually obtains a DNP which is a universal predicate
[Galilei 1638, 190–191]; it represents an hypothesis solving the problem;
9. Which then the author translates—by merely dropping the two nega-
tions of this DPN—into the corresponding affirmative proposition in
order to deductively derive from it, now considered as a postulate subject
to classical logic, all possible consequences to be tested by experiment.
Galileo is the only scientist apart from Einstein to have illustrated this
logical step through admirably precise words [Einstein 1905a, 891]:
Let us then, for the present, take this as a postulate, the
absolute truth of which will be established when we find
that the inferences from this hypothesis correspond to agree
perfectly with experiment [Galilei 1638], [Galilei 1638, 183,
period before Theorem 1, Proposition I of the Naturally
accelerated motion; emphasis added]16
However, Galileo ignored the alternative logical nature of both the DNPs
and the ad absurdum arguments, maybe because his way of reasoning by means
of DNPs was sometimes invalid (actually, it was invalid, according to recent
studies, also in the deductive reasoning) [De Luise & Drago 2009, fn. 15]. I
conclude that, his genius was capable of achieving exceptional, but irregular
results in logic.
16. This author’s translation is justified by appealing to the principle of sufficient
reason, which Galileo applies, but not in the right place, in the conclusion of the
next cycle of reasoning: “where the mobile moves indifferently to either the motion
or the rest, and by itself has no inclination to the motion to no location, nor any
resistance to be removed; because in the same way it is impossible that a heavy
body or a compound of such bodies naturally increases its height, by going away
from the common center towards which all heavy bodies converge, in the same way
it is impossible that it spontaneously moves, if such a motion does not approach the
above-mentioned common center” [Galilei 1638, 203].
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Hp = hypothesis; ⊥ = absurd; k = constant; s = distance; t = time; v = velocity
Table 1.The eight cycles of reasoning in De motu locali
8 Conclusion: What is Galileo’s role in this
centuries long historical process?
First, one has to take into account that Galileo’s methodological change
and his several scientific results were not enough to give rise to modern
science because he did not achieve any complete physical theory. Rather
both Cusanus and Galileo anticipated scientific theories. On this point a
comparison is not easy because their advances anticipated two very different
scientific theories, respectively chemistry [Drago 2009b], which was born three
centuries after Cusanus; and mechanics, which was born a few decades after
Galileo’s death. Strangely enough, neither anticipated geometrical optics; it
was instead anticipated by Grosseteste four centuries before its birth, which
occurred in the last period of Galileo’s life. Hence, an appraisal on Galileo’s
role cannot refer to a complete scientific object, but only to the elements of
physical theories. We will consider their most important elements, i.e., the
foundational choices.
Let us compare Cusanus and Galileo with regard to the two theoretical
dialectics. Cusanus was the first to conceive mathematics non-Platonically
and he improved the mathematics of the time by first introducing infinity;
and regarding infinity, he formulated, albeit in verbal terms, the notion of
limit in PI mathematics and a basic notion of AI mathematics. First Cusanus
made them manifest through the invention of new mathematical notions and
new (theological) theories which relied on the alternative choices—respectively,
AI and PO—to the dominant ones, PI and AO. He introduced a new logic,
which he qualified as non-Aristotelian, at present recognized as intuitionist.
Moreover, he intensively discussed the two dialectics regarding infinity and
logic. Already Cassirer stressed that no one more than Cusanus, after the
first of his main books, De docta ignorantia of 1444, accomplished such a
metaphysical change [Cassirer 1950, 277].
One century and a half after Cusanus came Galileo, who discussed the
relevance of the two kinds of infinity in theoretical physics, any way he did
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not decide whether and how this dialectic had to be solved by a scientist;
but he did not want to appeal to AI. In addition, he knew well both the
organization of a theory and the logic suggested by Aristotle. He looked for
an alternative logic, yet his Paduan period did not lead him to suggest a specific
novelty; although as a matter of fact he adapted some of his theoretical works
to the characteristic features of the model of a PO theory, e.g., the DNPs,
he considered an alternative organization of a theory to be no more than a
Platonic dialogue.
I conclude that regarding the two theoretical dialectics Cusanus was more
advanced than Galileo.
In conclusion, it is to Galileo glory to have given birth to science in
its first dialectic through systematic experimental practice; he was aware
of the other two theoretical dialectics, but was inconclusive about them.
For these reasons he has rightly been characterized as “The first modern
scientist and the last of the ancient Greeks”. Cusanus played a somewhat
complementary role; regarding the first dialectic, he has suggested only a
programme for an experimental science of nature; however, regarding the
latter two theoretical dialectics he preceded and was more advanced than
Galileo, so that he anticipated the discovery of them. Which allows us to
characterize Cusanus by means of a similar definition to the one above: “The
last of the medieval scientists and the first philosopher of the foundations of
modern science”.17 Although Cusanus had a considerable influence on the
Italian intellectual milieu, e.g., on Leon Battista Alberti, Leonardo da Vinci
and Giordano Bruno, no direct connection with Galileo is known. Had Galileo
assumed Cusanus’ priorities, he would represent the culmination of a long
intellectual effort started more than one century before. If, alternatively, he
did not know Cusanus’ works, Galileo’s genius proves to be even greater, but
also little explained.
After Galileo, without any discussion about the said dialectics, Newton
decided the theoretical dichotomies with a pair of choices, which became a
paradigm throughout the two subsequent centuries of development of theoret-
ical physics. Due to this fact, a winter set in thinking about the two theoretical
dialectics; in this winter only two scientists, i.e., L. Carnot [Carnot 1803, xiii–
xvii, 3] and independently Einstein [Einstein 1905], made manifest the four
choices, without receiving attention on this subject [Drago 2013]. Hence, one
more merit has to be attributed to Galileo, i.e., at the very beginning of modern
science to have presented through his discussions almost all the foundational
issues of the scientific enterprise which have been re-discovered only after a
very long period of time.
17. Koyré acknowledge him as “the last great philosopher of the dying Middle Age”
[Koyré 1957, 6]. Cassirer as “the first modern philosopher” [Cassirer 1950, 31–56].
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